ABSTRACT The authentication protocols are implemented to provide identity authentication for communication entities. With the increasing demand of network security and the development of technology, the anonymous authentication protocol for LBS (location based service) has gradually become a research hotspot and attracted extensive attentions, which provides anonymity of the user, confidentiality of location information and identity authentication simultaneously. An efficient and secure anonymous authentication protocol with enhanced privacy for location based service using asymmetric cryptography was proposed by Memon et al. in 2015. However, some scholars pointed out some weaknesses of Memon et al.'s protocol, such as the lack of resistance to password change attack, privileged insider attack and offline password guessing attack. They also pointed out the protocol failed to prevent adversaries from getting the sessionspecific temporary information. Besides, the mutual authentication was not perfect. Therefore, in this paper, we further analyze the security of Memon et al.'s protocol and propose an improved anonymous authentication protocol for location based service. We use the timestamp mechanism and rely on CDH (Computational Diffie-Hellman) problem to improve security primarily. The security of the proposed protocol is verified using BAN logic and the performance comparison and efficiency analysis are carried out. The results show that our improved protocol has higher security with little more computation cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of mobile Internet applications, security issues have emerged and become an important factor restricting the development of this field. As an important part of network information security, authentication [1] is one of the most important defenses in system security. So far, a series of authentication protocols have been designed and implemented successively [2] - [7] . Moreover, the classification of authentication protocols is increasing.Partition of authentication protocols from the underlying algorithms, they can be divided into symmetric cryptography, public key cryptography and authentication protocol based on trusted third party. The authentication protocol based on symmetric cipher means that before the two parties start the The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Xiao Liu. communication, they share a symmetric key and agree on a symmetric encryption algorithm. The authentication protocol based on public key cryptography relies on the public key certificate architecture. The claimant A signs an attribute or identity information with its private key, and correspondingly, verifier B can obtain A's public key through the public key certificate architecture to further verify A's signature. In the above two authentication protocols, it is necessary to assume that both communicating parties have shared the key in advance or one party has acquired the public key of the other party in advance. However, it is unrealistic to require the system to maintain the communication state of all participants in the standard communication mode. The authentication protocol based on trusted third party is to enable the unknown subject to establish a secure communication channel through the trusted third party before the authentication, that is, the communication parties establish a new and secure session key VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ FIGURE 1. Weakness 3: Known session specific temporary information.
for encryption or signature operation. Our protocol is based on trusted third party. But now more and more authentication protocols not only realize mutual authentication [8] of user information, but also realize the anonymity [9] - [11] in the process of user authentication, which further improves the security level of the protocols. In 2008, Wu et al. [12] proposed a secure authentication scheme with anonymity for wireless communications. In 2012, Mun et al. [5] analyzed Wu et al.'s authentication scheme and proposed an enhanced anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in global mobility networks. In 2014, Zhao et al.'s [6] scheme found that Mun et al.'s scheme was vulnerable to impersonation attacks and insider attacks, and could not provide user friendliness, user's anonymity, proper mutual authentication and local verification. They also proposed a secure and effective anonymous authentication scheme. Futher than that, with the development of mobile communication and positioning system, people put forward higher requirements for network security. In addition to the implementation of authentication service, users' private location information [13] , [14] also needs to be protected. Because location data can be used to hurt a person financially, analyze targeted behavior to personalize special offers and ads, make tracking or physical attacks possible, or infer embarrassing tendencies [15] . Although the concept of the LBSs was enshrined in the E911 mandate adopted by the US government back in 1996, it was only in 2005 that the winds of the LBSs began to blow-this time in the right direction. Several important developments and favorable conditions revived LBSs at that time, such as the emergence of GPS-enabled mobile devices and the introduction of third-generation broadband wireless services [16] . At that time, there was a broad discussion about LBS privacy risks: many countries adapted their privacy laws accordingly or passed new ones, while LBS providers adopted novel technical solutions to enforce privacy protection. As Bellavista et al. [17] suggested that there were three ways to achieve location protection, one technical solution was dynamic trust management [18] - [20] , which was a mechanism to dynamically establish trust relationships with not only centralized entities but also peer-to-peer entities (to which clients disclosed their location at runtime).
Both Memon et al.'s protocol [21] and our protocol are to apply this approach. Another solution was a user-controlled privacy policy [22] - [24] , a shift to a user-centric approach that somewhat simplified the issue of location privacy protection by allowing users to directly manage their location data and decide whether and at what level of granularity to expose it to the LBSs. Another technique used by LBS providers was pseudonyms [11] , [25] . Instead of disclosing a user's location with his or her true identity, a pseudonym was attached to the user's location. Besides, Jaiswal and Nandi [26] presented a new approach to protect privacy in LBS services in 2010. This is also an excellent way. The approach revolved around implementing a decentralized matching service using structured coverage that established an interface between the operator and LBS.
In 2015, Memon et al. found that Zhao et al.'s [6] scheme were vulnerable to disclose the mobile client password and could not prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Moreover, they proposed an efficient and secure anonymous authentication protocol with enhanced privacy for location based service using asymmetric cryptography. They thought their protocol was more suitable for low power and resource limited wireless system. Vanga, et al. [27] and Reddy et al. [28] of Memon et al.'s protocol, such as the lack of resistance to password change attack, privileged insider attack, offline password guessing attack, known session specific temporary information attack and the lack of mutual authentication. In addition, since the limited computing ability of mobile devices, the protocols need to be lightweight and efficient [30] . Then, we propose an efficient anonymous authentication scheme for location based service and conduct security analysis. In terms of protocol security analysis, protocol security proof methods are basically divided into two categories: formal proof method and verifiable security method. According to the differences in design ideas, there are three types of typical formal analysis methods: logical derivation, model detection, and theorem proving. BurrowsAbadi-Needham logic (BAN logic) [31] is wide logic derivation method and Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) is a set of complete, standard formalized automatic analysis tool. The security of the proposed protocol is verified using BAN logic [32] . The security analysis shows that the proposed scheme provides the mutual authentication between the mobile client and the location base services/base transceiver station. Meanwhile, the performance comparison and efficiency analysis are carried out in Table 3 . The performance analysis proves that it is suitable for practical applications with higher security and little more computation cost.
II. REVIEW OF MEMON et al.'s SCHEME
In this section, we will review the Memon et al. ' 
B. AUTHENTICATION PHASE
In this phase, MC moves into a region handled by BTS, the mobile user will be authenticated anonymously by LBSs.
Mc inserts the smart card into the reader and inputs its Step1: Mc chooses c and computes 
C. SESSION SPECIFIC TEMPORARY INFORMATION ATTACK
In the authentication phase, we use the timestamp mechanism and CDH (Computational Diffie-Hellman) to provide session specific temporary information attack. The session key SK = h(R 7 ||h(abP · x)||ID BTS ||ID LBSs ||T 2 ||T 3 ), where a, b are generated freshly for each session. Based on CDH , it is a computational difficult problem to guess abP provided aP and bP. And the timestamp mechanism means the session message is not the latest. The verifying of V 1 , V 2 , and C MF can ensure SK are valid.
D. REPLAY ATTACK
Replay attack in the authentication phase, even if the attacker intercepts messages, the message cannot be replayed successfully. Since we use the timestamp mechanism to prevent replay attacks. Timestamps use to represent the effective time of message. The attack do not have the ability to forge V 1 , V 2 , V 3 .
E. PASSWORK CHANGE ATTACK
In the passwork change phase, Mc inserts the smart card into the smart card reader and inputs ID Mc 
H. PERFECT FORWARD SECRECY
We use the timestamp mechanism and CDH to provide the secrecy.
, where T 1 , T 2 are generated freshly for each session in the authentication phase. Based on CDH , it is a computationally difficult problem to guess bcP provided cP and bP. Therefore, the perfect forward secrecy is prevented in our scheme
VI. AUTHENTICATION PROOF BASED ON BAN LOGIC
In this section, through the formal security analysis using the widely-accepted Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic (BAN logic), it is shown that scheme provides the mutual authentication between a mobile user Mc and LBSs/BTS. Goals According to the analytic procedures of the BAN logic, the proposed scheme must satisfy the following test goals in order to prove the system is secure: Since the value V 1 is derived from S 2 and it a fresh message, from the message S 4 and nonce-verification rule, we have,
From message m 3 , we have,
From H 6 , S 6 and message-meaning rule, we have,
From H 2 , S 6 , nonce-verification rule and freshnessconjuncatenation rule, we obtain,
BTS.
From H 12 , S 8 and jurisdiction rule, we have,
From m 4 ,
From H 5 , S 10 and message-meaning rule, we have,
It is clear from the computation of the session key SK = h(bR 4 
VII. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
To evaluate the computational time analysis, we account T h ≈ 0.0023ms, T mul ≈ 2.226ms, T fun ≈ 0.0046ms as reported in [33] and [34] . According to the Table 3 and  Table 4 , our protocol provides more security features with the addition of a small amount of computation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this study, we review Memon et al.'s authentication protocol for location based service using asymmetric cryptography and point out some weaknesses. Then, we propose an improved anonymous authentication protocol for location based service. The identity of the mobile client is never sent in plaintext and the success probability of guessing both the identity and the password of the mobile client is negligible, which can ensure anonymity, resist offline password guessing attack and privileged-insider attack. Further than that, we use the timestamp mechanism and rely on CDH problem to prevent adversaries from getting the session-specific temporary information, and provide perfect forward secrecy. Timestamps used to represent the effective time of the message, which also can resist replay attack. The security of the proposed protocol is verified using BAN logic and the performance comparison and efficiency analysis are carried out in Table 3 and Table 4 . The performance analysis proves that the proposed protocol is suitable for practical applications and has higher security with little more computation cost. 
